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Abstract
Taking the mean-variance portfolio model as a benchmark, we compute the optimally 
diversified portfolio for banks located in France, Germany, the U.K., and the U.S. under 
different assumptions about currency hedging. We compare these optimal portfolios to the 
actual cross-border assets of banks from 1995-1999 and try to explain the deviations. We find 
that banks over-invest domestically to a considerable extent and that cross-border 
diversification entails considerable gain. Banks underweight countries which are culturally 
less similar or have capital controls in place. Capital controls have a strong impact on the 
degree of underinvestment whereas less political risk increases the degree of over-investment.  
Keywords:  International banking, portfolio diversification, international integration.  
JEL-classification: G21, G11, E44, F40. 
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The international activities of commercial banks have expanded rapidly over the past few 
decades, although banks in most countries still hold only a small fraction of their portfolios in 
foreign claims. This paper focuses on the driving forces behind and the possible barriers to 
the internationalization of banks.
International diversification may help banks decrease their exposure to systematic risks. 
Through their transformation of assets, banks carry a considerably degree of non-diversifiable 
economic risks on their books. Given high costs of financial distress, international extensions 
of credit may improve the diversification of these systematic risks. To the extent that 
international lending is associated with higher returns, banks’ risk-return trade-off may also 
be improved overall.
1
An assessment of potential barriers necessarily requires a benchmark. The main 
contribution of this paper is to study the issue of banks’ internationalization against a well-
defined, computable, one: the mean-variance portfolio model (Markowitz 1952, 1959) and its 
international extension (Solnik 1973, Sercu 1980), in which investors reap benefits from 
diversification.
We use data on the bilateral cross-border assets of banks located in four major reporting 
economies (France, Germany, the U.K., and the U.S.) provided by the Bank of International 
Settlement (BIS), covering the period 1995-1999. Hence we study the diversification gains 
from international banking related to counter-party location or country risks. These risks 
consist primarily of transfer, political, and currency risk. 
Our empirical analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we compute a set of optimally 
diversified portfolios for banks in each of the four reporting countries using standard mean-
variance optimization under different assumptions about the hedging of foreign currency risk. 
Second, we compare these benchmark portfolios to banks’ actual portfolios. Third, we run 
regressions to explain the differences between actual and benchmark portfolios. 
We find that banks in the four reporting countries may improve their risk-return trade-off 
considerably by investing more internationally relative to investing purely in (risky) domestic 
assets. Furthermore, we find that banks over-invest domestically relative to the benchmark 
portfolios. In particular, banks appear to have preferences (overweight relative to benchmark) 
for certain markets (countries) and these preferences are associated with the presence of 
capital controls and cultural homogeneity. Thus, banks in the reporting countries tend to 
underweight countries with which they are less similar or which have capital controls in 
_______________
1   Alternatively, banks may take risks off balance sheet through the use of derivatives. 
Hellwig (1998) discusses the asset transformation function of banks and their exposure to 
non-diversifiable risks.place. Regressing the deviation between our benchmark and actual portfolio weight on 
variables proxying for capital controls, information costs, political risk, and credit risk, we 
find strong evidence that the degree of underweighting is larger when capital controls are in 
place. Given banks’ preferences for lending to certain countries, we also find strong evidence 
that political risk systematically affects the degree of overinvestment, such that an 
improvement in risk conditions is associated with increased over-investment. We do not, 
however, find systematic evidence that the degree of underweighting co-varies with proxies 
for informational barriers related to cultural differences or geographical distance. 
Our paper is linked to three strands of literature:
First, other work studies the internationalization of the banking industry. However, most of 
this work focuses on banks’ establishment of foreign offices (see, e.g., Goldberg and 
Saunders 1980, 1981, Hultman and McGee 1989, Focarelli and Pozzolo 2001) or on the 
importance of nationality in the bank relationships of non-financial multinational firms
(Berger et al. 2002). The internationalization of the banking industry generally occurs along 
two dimensions: through direct cross-border lending to a foreign counter-party, (international
banking), and through the ownership of foreign branches or subsidiaries (multi-national, or
global, banking). Few empirical studies have looked at the cross-border lending of banks
2,
and none consider the portfolio aspects of banks’ international lending.
There is currently considerable interest in assessing the integration of bank markets.
Relative to the approach taken in the present paper, it is worth noting that the establishment of
foreign banking offices is not a necessary condition for integration. Perhaps when country 
risks are less costly and/or can more easily be controlled, credit can flow freely, in the form of 
direct cross-border lending, to locations that offer the best risk-return tradeoff in line with the 
mean-variance benchmark. Hence, understanding the factors limiting direct cross-border 
lending is an important part to understanding financial integration. 
Second, our approach is related to the literature on the international integration of equity 
markets and the home bias puzzle (Levy and Sarnat 1970, French and Poterba 1991, Tesar 
and Werner 1995).
3 Burger and Warnock (2003) study diversification of international bond 
portfolios. We do not, however, use the capital market equilibrium of the international asset 
pricing model, namely the global market portfolio, as our benchmark. Rather, we take the 
return on banks’ international investment opportunities as given, and “calibrate” the demand
functions, hence computing banks’ optimally diversified portfolios. Hence, we do not assume
that the return on banks’ cross-border assets is generated by the international CAPM. 
_______________
2 Exceptions are Buch (2002), and Goldberg (2001) who considers both of the above 
dimensions.
3 Stulz (1994), Lewis (1999) and Karolyi and Stulz (2001) survey this literature.
3A recent strand of the international finance literature uses gravity-type models to estimate
the determinants of international investment choices.
4 One variable that has been used to 
proxy information costs is the geographical distance between two markets. Empirical studies 
find a negative link between international asset holdings or international capital flows, on the 
one hand, and distance, on the other hand (Buch 2003, Burger and Warnock 2002, Focarelli 
and Pozzolo 2001, Portes and Rey 1999 and 2001, Wei and Wu 2002).
 5  In contrast to the
findings of the above papers, we do not find strong evidence that geographical distance can 
explain the deviation from our benchmark portfolios.
Finally, our paper is related to the portfolio approach of banking. The early papers by Pyle 
(1971) and Hart and Jaffee (1974) explain the existence of financial intermediaries within the 
mean-variance framework. Later applications of the portfolio model are Koehn and 
Santomero (1980) and Kim and Santomero (1988) which analyze the impact of capital 
regulation on banks’ portfolio and choice of risk.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes our methodological
approach and discusses risks and returns in international banking. Section 3 presents the data 
and the construction of the benchmark portfolio weights. The empirical results are presented 
in Section 4 and 5, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Methodological  Approach
Our benchmark mean-variance approach used to determine the composition of the optimal
international portfolio requires measurement of the risks of and returns to international 
lending. We discuss below the assumptions that we make in deriving these return, including 
the hedging of exchange rate risks.
2.1 Risk and Return in International Banking 
Standard portfolio theory asserts that international diversification benefits investors because it 
expands the choice set of assets. Low correlations between domestic and foreign assets lower 
the risk of an international portfolio and improve the risk-return trade-off of the investment
opportunity set.
6 Banks may therefore benefit from holding foreign assets either because they 
gain access to activities with higher net present value than those available in domestic
_______________
4 Martin and Rey (2001) provide a theoretical underpinning of the gravity model of 
international finance.
5 In the banking literature, distance has been used as a proxy for banks’ ability to monitor
(see e.g. Petersen and Rajan 2000), although Degryse and Ongena (2002) find that distance 
proxies for effects of price-discrimination.
6 See, e.g., Solnik (1974). However, the risk-return gain is hard to determine empirically on 
the basis of ex-post data, in part because of measurement error; see Jorion (1985). 
4markets or because they can diversify location-specific risks. Since the costs of financial 
distress are high in banking, improved diversification would be value-enhancing.
7
As Table 3 shows, however, in banks’ actual portfolios domestic holdings far exceed 
foreign claims. Hence, it appears that banks may not be taking advantage of gains from
international diversification. To quantify that proposition, we need to know the benchmark
portfolio under optimal diversification.
We study what the optimal risk-return trade-off implies for banks’ cross-border allocation 
of assets using bilateral observations on banks’ foreign assets. We compute a benchmark
portfolio against which we compare banks’ actual cross-border holdings, and we run 
regressions of the difference between the two on variables which may capture barriers to 
banks’ cross-border extension of credit. If risks associated with cross-border lending cannot 
be controlled at reasonable costs due to asymmetries of information, regulations or the like, 
banks will abstain from direct cross-border transactions. For example, costs of obtaining 
information may limit banks’ ability to monitor foreign borrowers and the ability to monitor
may be closely related to the cultural ties between the location of the lender and borrower.
8
When lending internationally, banks are also exposed to currency risk and various country 
risks.
9 The expected return and risks on assets held against a counter-party residing in country 
i will generally have a country-component that may not be fully diversified away in an 
international portfolio:
o The currency denomination of assets will expose the lender to currency risk. If a 
country has a high interest rate differential vis-à-vis the world average, this may
indicate the presence of a premium for currency risk equal to the expected 
devaluation of the foreign currency (cf. uncovered interest rate parity). 
o Foreign positions may be subjected to transfer risk to the extent there are either 
restrictions on capital movements or even some probability that currency controls 
may be imposed by the foreign government to limit capital outflows, as occurred, for 
example, in Malaysia in 1997 in the wake of the Asian crisis.
_______________
7 There is generally little quantitative evidence of the gain from “going international” in 
banking. Whalen (1988) provides some evidence that the size of gains from international 
diversification may be significant. Acharya, Hasan and Saunders (2002) consider gains 
from geographical diversification and test the model of Winton (1999) on a sample of 
Italian banks. They find support that regional diversification improves the risk-return 
tradeoff for banks that have low to moderate levels of downside risk. 
8 Even within countries, investment patterns have been found to be guided by regional and 
cultural proximity (Coval and Moskowitz 1999, Grinblatt and Keloharju 2000). 
9 See Stigum (1990) for an extensive discussion of country risks involved in international 
banking.
5o Other country risks include regulatory, legal and political risks. Examples are the 
Mexican and Russian debt moratoriums of 1994 and 1998, or the imposition of 
minimum reserve requirements on cross-border credits of the type imposed in Chile 
in the 1990s.
The above types of risk have a direct effect on the expected rate of return on banks’ cross-
border assets. Currency risk affects the rate of return on banking assets directly if assets are 
denominated in the foreign currency. Any factor that potentially lowers the ability of
borrowers to repay their debt – such as the imposition of currency controls or other regulatory 
factors – affect the expected rate of return on banking assets. The benchmark portfolio that we 
calculate thus reflects risks which are material to international banking.
2.2 Assumptions of the Benchmark Portfolio 
The empirical approach of this paper follows three steps. In the first step, we compute
“optimal” portfolios for banks international assets. In the second step, we compare actual and 
benchmark portfolios and, in the third step, we try to explain these deviations.
We use the mean-variance portfolio model (Markowitz 1952, 1959) and its international 
extension (Solnik 1973, Sercu 1980) as our benchmark model for the optimal diversification 
of banks’ cross-border asset portfolio. Using the mean-variance model to evaluate the gains 
from international banking is equivalent to the following standard model of the bank decision 
problem:
o There is a representative risk-averse bank in each country.
o Banks face a menu choice of N composite risky assets corresponding to N different 
locations (countries), including the domestic market. Furthermore, there is a risk-free 
domestic asset. Our focus is the allocation of the risky portfolio of assets, not the 
split between risky and riskless assets.
o Banks take interest rates on the risky assets as given and choose the international 
allocation that maximizes the risk-return tradeoff (Sharpe ratio) subject to a no-short-
sales constraint.
10
We impose the short-sales constraint because we view banks’ assets and liabilities as 
fundamentally different kinds of contracts; otherwise, when computing the benchmark
portfolio, we would be forced to make the unpalatable assumption that a short-sale of a loan 
to a particular country was equivalent to issuing a new deposit in that country. The 
benchmark portfolio of risky assets is determined as the portfolio on the efficient
_______________
10 If returns on bank claims are normally distributed, this is consistent with any utility 
function in a one-period model. Alternatively, for non-normal returns, restrictions must be 
placed on the utility function.
6(constrained) frontier with the highest Sharpe ratio (i.e. the ratio of the excess return of the 
portfolio to its standard deviation), which we calculate by mapping out the constrained 
frontier.
11 Hence, we focus on banks’ holdings of risky assets and ignore the weight on the 
domestic riskfree portfolio. Of course, in the portfolio model, a bank’s optimal total portfolio
is a linear combination of the riskfree domestic asset and the risky portfolio, with the relative 
weights depending on banks’ degree of risk aversion. In our analysis we are interested in 
banks’ preferences for investing domestically versus abroad and less in banks’ preferences for 
safe and risky assets. Since the relative weights on the domestic and foreign assets in the risky 
portfolio are unaffected by the degree of risk aversion, we ignore the safe part of the 
portfolio.
12
Applying a mean-variance optimization framework to study banks’ cross-border asset 
allocation implies that we are making two additional simplifying assumptions:
First, the decomposition of the asset and liability side implicit in this setup is equivalent to 
a view of a bank that faces a menu of exogenously given investment opportunities and that 
will attempt to raising funding for any nonnegative net present value project. The large banks 
that are behind most of international lending fund most of their activities with borrowed fund, 
raised in the money market as opposed to a branching network, which lends support to the 
above view. Banks’ ability to expand their balance sheet is of course subject to various 
constraints, such as reserve and capital ratio requirements which work to pin down the overall 
size of the asset portfolio. Such constraints are abstracted from in this paper. We simply
derive the composition of the Sharpe-ratio maximizing portfolio and compare it to banks’ 
actual composition, treating portfolio size as exogenous.
13 While a simultaneous treatment of
banks’ assets and liabilities is essential in an analysis of the risks that banks carry on their 
books, in this paper, our perspective is rather to as ask how much risk banks can take off their 
books by means of cross-border diversification. 
Second, the mean-variance benchmark treats banks as price-takers. This assumption differs 
in an important aspect from the modern theory of financial intermediation which rationalizes 
the existence of banks by the asymmetry of information in credit markets.
14 The return to 
_______________
11 We compute each point on the frontier by finding the set of weights which, for a given 
mean return, minimizes the standard deviation of the portfolio, subject to the non-
negativity constraint. 
12 When we compare the benchmark portfolio with banks’ actual portfolios we use data on 
banks’ holdings of risky domestic assets only.
13 That binding capital constraints may affect the extent of banks’ international lending at an 
aggregate level has recently been showed by Peek and Rosengren (1997, 2000). 
14  Seminal references are Leland and Pyle (1977), Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Diamond
(1984). Freixas and Rochet (1998) gives a comprehensive exposition of the theory of 
financial intermediation.
7monitoring and the connection between credit risk and asymmetries of information are central 
elements in the theory of financial intermediation which are abstracted from in the mean-
variance model. Hence, information costs are a potential source of deviation between our 
benchmark portfolios and banks’ actual portfolios. We consider this possibility explicitly in 
the analysis below by including regressors that proxy for information costs when we look for 
explanations for the deviation between the benchmark and actual portfolios.
Summing up, banks should not be, and indeed do not appear to be, indifferent about the 
risk-return trade-off on their asset portfolios. International cross-border lending is likely to 
entail gains from diversification although benefits may be reduced if barriers such as 
asymmetric information or regulatory restrictions raise the relative cost of international 
lending. The value of the portfolio model is that it serves as an explicit and computable
benchmark focusing on banks’ exposures to the various country risks that are inherent to 
international loan markets. Note that this choice of benchmark does not imply an assumption
that banks’ cross-border lending returns are generated by the CAPM. Rather, we take the 
return on cross-border lending as given and compute banks’ corresponding asset demands (or, 
equivalently, supply of funds). The portfolio model is clearly not a model of the fundamental
asset transformation process performed by banks, but its usefulness lies in the provision of an 
explicit benchmark, which, through a deviation-from-benchmark measure, may help us pin 
down some of the forces that underlie international banking.
2.3 Hedged  Returns
When banks invest internationally, they are exposed to currency risk: changes in exchange 
rates imply that banks located in different countries face different investment opportunity sets 
when they convert the return on foreign assets into their domestic currency. Therefore, we 
calculate three alternative sets of benchmark portfolio weights differing in the assumptions
they make about how banks choose to hedge their exposure for currency risk. We do not 
actually observe the currency-denomination of the bilateral positions in our data. However, 
we assume that the currency denomination coincides with the location of the counter-party as 
long as that counter party is a OECD-member. Liquid derivatives markets for foreign 
exchange exist for all OECD-countries in our sample, so this assumption does not seem
inappropriate. For emerging market, however, liquid forward markets do not necessarily exist, 
hence returns against emerging market counter parties are measured in USD and can be 
hedged with the USD-forward rate.
Using these assumptions, we compute the following hedging portfolios: 
o In Case 1, we assume that banks do not hedge their currency exposures and hence 
choose to carry that risk on their books. This may correspond to a situation where it 
is optimal for banks to leave their foreign investments unhedged, either because the 
costs of hedging are too high or because hedging involves the assumption of other 
8costly risks. Alternatively, it may be the case that the cost of bearing the risks is low 
for banks, for example because currency risk may be diversified in a large portfolio.
o In Case 2, we assume banks hedge their principal investment fully (“unit hedge”), 
locking in the future sales price of the foreign currency through the sale of a forward 
or futures contract. This case may be seen as capturing the situation where banks 
choose to hedge currency risk on-balance sheet through matching liabilities. On-
balance sheet hedging works to lower the volatility of returns.
o In Case 3, we assume banks hedge optimally according to the international asset 
pricing model (Sercu 1980).
15 The hedge ratio minimizes volatility of the hedged 
position by taking into account the correlations between the risky assets and 
currencies. This case may be interpreted as a situation where banks actively manage
their currency risks and are willing to take open positions to benefit from the 
structure of covariances. 
3 Data 
3.1 Banks’ Cross-Border Assets 
To compute the geographical dispersion of banks’ portfolios, we use the locational data 
published by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in its Quarterly Review (also 
known as the BIS Territorial Data). For each reporting country, the BIS reports the assets 
held vis-á-vis recipient countries from both the developed and the developing world. 
Supplementing the BIS Quarterly Review with historical unpublished data obtained from the 
BIS, we are able to construct a panel data set of annual bilateral assets positions for the 
following four reporting countries; France, Germany, United Kingdom, and the United States. 
The data sample used in this study covers the period from 1995 to 1999. 
The data provide information on the total value of assets of banks located in the reporting 
countries against counter-parties located abroad (recipient countries). Only the total dollar 
value of the claims against counter-parties located abroad is collected. Hence, determining the 
benefit from investing abroad, the assets on any recipient country are best thought of as a 
composite asset with a return that is subjected to various country risks.  This composite asset 
spans various types of assets against various types of counter-parties. In particular, besides 
location of counter-party, the maturity, cash flow, and currency denomination are 
characteristics that may differ across the contracts that make up the composite asset. In 
addition, asset positions include trade-related credit, holdings and own issues of international 
securities (except the US), and permanent financial interests in other undertakings such as 
_______________
15 The international asset-pricing model implies that, in the presence of exchange rate risk, 
the benchmark portfolio involves taking positions in both foreign assets and currencies.
9equity positions (participations). Off-balance sheet items are generally excluded. The types of 
counter-parties contained in the cross-border position in our data include other banks, 
nonbanks, and own subsidiaries located abroad (by the locational nature of the data).
16 At the 
aggregate level, about two-thirds of international assets are interbank assets, and most of 
these are denominated in the major currencies. The distinguishing feature of our data set is the 
location of counter-party, whereas the other contractual dimensions (such as currency, 
maturity, type of counterparty) are not available to us at the bilateral level.
The BIS locational data do not quite allow us to construct a perfect picture of the 
international (as opposed to cross-border) diversification of banks’ portfolios, as the location 
and ownership of counter-party do not necessarily coincide. In particular, the locational data 
do not consolidate assets vis-à-vis foreign branches and subsidiaries of the banks in the 
reporting country.
17 Bilateral consolidated data were not collected by the BIS prior to 1999. 
Hence, we cannot distinguish loans made by UK-chartered banks to (say) Japan from funds 
channeled to Japan by Japanese subsidiaries located in London. Because interoffice positions 
are not netted out, our measured cross-border diversification may be a noisy measure of the 
international diversification of banks’ actual portfolios. While the locational data may lead us 
to overstate international diversification by not netting out interoffice claims, they may also 
lead us to understate diversification by not considering the foreign positions of foreign offices 
located abroad. The direction of the bias also depends on the interoffice accounting practices 
of banks. To get a sense of the extent of this noise, we compare for the one overlapping year 
of 1999 the regional structure of actual portfolio weights measured by the locational data with 
the BIS bilateral consolidated data. We find fairly small differences for Germany, France and 
the U.S.: the deviation between the two portfolio weight measures is in the order of five 
percentage points for any individual recipient country, and typically much lower than that, 
and the sign of the difference varies in an unsystematic fashion across recipient countries. For 
the U.K., due to London’s position as a financial center, the size of the unconsolidated 
portfolio is rather larger than the consolidated portfolio, hence we underestimate the portfolio 
share of the domestic risky asset by 30 percentage points, making U.K. banks look overly 
diversified. Also, cross-border investment against counter-parties in the U.S. is overestimated
by about six percent (these are most likely interoffice positions of U.S. subsidiaries/offices in 
London). We comment on this latter observation in section 4.3, but in general the results 
appear not to be seriously affected by the noise in the locational data.
Our computation of the benchmark portfolio also requires information about assets held 
domestically. We obtain data on the domestic bank assets for the four reporting countries 
_______________
16 Our data cover several different types of on-balance sheet contracts, including interbank 
deposits, syndicated lending, revolving credit, securities, and participations.
17 That is, any office, branch or subsidiary of foreign banks residing in, say, the U.S. are 
registered as “banks in the U.S.”. 
10from the IMF publication International Financial Statistics (domestic assets are not collected 
by the BIS). We subtract out domestic claims on the government sector. Notice that because 
the domestic data are taken from a different source, the measurement of the relative size of 
domestic and foreign positions may be affected by measurement error. The domestic risk-free 
asset is proxied by the 3-month Tbill contract for each of the reporting countries.
3.2 Estimating Returns on Banks’ Cross-Border Assets 
In order to determine the opportunity set that banks face in an international context, we need 
to estimate the expected returns and risks of the foreign composite assets. Banks typically 
lend at LIBOR plus a spread to each individual counter party depending on the credit rating of 
that counter party. The mark-up also contains a premium for transfer and political risk. We
want our benchmark portfolio to be based on returns that price transfer and political risk 
which is an integral part of international banking.
Note that we cannot treat the return at date t as a known rate of interest earned on an 
investment maturing in a given period of time, i.e as a standard fixed-income security, as the 
expected return will be stochastic, even if the promised return is not. Also, given that we are 
working with a composite asset observed annually, to the extent that assets are of shorter 
maturity or that the interest is reset at intermediary dates, the future return earned on the 
composite claim will be random. For example, a bank that lends under a line of credit is 
exposed to both interest and quantity risk.
Based on these two considerations, we use total returns on sovereign bond indices to 
measure banks’ expected return on cross-border assets: for the OECD-countries in our 
sample, which all have liquid and liberalized capital markets during the sample period, we 
compute returns measured in the domestic currency from the MSCI-sovereign bond indices. 
For emerging markets, we use the JP Morgan EMBI+ indices, which are USD-denominated
bonds, to calculate total returns. The EMBI+ indices are available from 1994, thus 
determining the starting year of our sample. Hence, we are (realistically) assuming that 
lending to emerging markets takes place in USD (see, e.g. Claessens et al. 2003). Ideally, we 
would have preferred to work with corporate debt indices but such are available for only few 
of the countries in our sample.
18 We estimate the means and variance-covariance matrix of 
each national index from monthly observations of 3-months returns, using the entire time-
series of observations (we do not use a rolling-window to allow for changes in expected 
_______________
18 Alternatively, one could in principle adjust the promised return, LIBOR, for a measure of 
expected losses from information of banks’ actual loan losses on a country-basis. To the 
best of our knowledge, bilateral data on loan losses are not collected by the regulatory 
authorities in any of the four reporting countries of our data set and hence such measures
are impossible to construct. 
11returns over time, and hence time-varying benchmark weights, because our time-dimension is 
relatively short which in a few instances produces unrealistically unstable weights). 
The essential feature of the benchmark portfolio thus is that it is calculated from returns 
that price the country risks faced by banks engaged in cross-border lending. Our benchmark
returns, however, may not capture individual counter-party credit risk to the extent such risk 
is priced at the aggregate level. But if any required premium for credit risk is approximately
the same across recipient countries, our estimated benchmark weights will be valid. This 
approximation will hold to the extent international transactions mostly take place between 
banks with an investment-grade credit-ratings. To account for the possibility that the 
approximation does not hold well, we include a proxy for credit risk of counter-parties in our 
regressions.
We construct a sample of the recipient countries based on the main criteria that data exist 
that allow us to construct times series of returns for the largest possible subset of countries in 
the BIS locational statistics, including both OECD and emerging markets using data from the 
Datastream data base. That leaves us with 21 countries: 12 OECD countries (Australia, 
Belgium, Canada, France, UK, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the 
US), and 9 non-OECD emerging markets (Argentina, Mexico, Morocco, Panama, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Venezuela, and Russia). These 21 countries cover between 80-90% of 
total cross-border assets of banks in the four reporting countries.
4 Actual versus Benchmark Portfolios: Empirical Results 
In this section, we first look at the actual regional structure of banks’ international asset 
portfolios. We then describe the estimated benchmark portfolios and the deviation from the 
benchmark.
4.1 Regional Structure of International Banking Assets
Figure 1 provides a breakdown of banks’ external assets by region of the recipient countries 
for the years 1995 and 1999. Foreign assets of the reporting countries are highly concentrated 
in other developed countries. For Germany, France, and the U.K., these countries accounted 
for around 80–90 percent of total foreign assets. U.S. banks had the smallest exposure to other 
developed countries (55 percent of the total). The main reason for this difference between the 
U.S. and the other reporting countries is the relatively large exposure of U.S. banks to 
developing countries in Latin America and to offshore financial centers.
During the 1980s and 90s, lending to other developed countries has increased in 
importance. This can be seen both in the portfolio shares of EU and of OECD countries. Two 
interpretations of this restructuring of portfolios are conceivable. On the one hand, the re-
structuring of portfolios may be the result of the financial crises of the late 1990s. Due to the 
12increase in risks associated with these crises, banks have tended to move away from emerging
markets. On the other hand, regulatory changes such as the creation of the EU’s Single 
Market or the Basle capital accord, which sets standards for the risk weighted assets of 
commercial banks and puts a lower weight on OECD countries, could be behind these 
patterns. We account for these two alternative explanations in our regressions below by using 
proxies for country risks as well as for regulatory changes at the EU level to explain 
differences in portfolio shares across countries. 
4.2 Gains from an International Portfolio 
Table 1 summarizes the benchmark portfolio characteristics for the three international 
benchmark portfolios under the assumption of unit-hedged, optimally hedged, and unhedged 
returns respectively for each of the reporting countries. The figures in the table are the 
average values over the five-year sample period. We also report the average return and 
volatility on the purely (risky) domestic portfolio.
19 A comparison of Sharpe ratios suggests 
the existence of considerable gains from international diversification. The Sharpe ratios are 
reported on an annualized basis; hence for, say, the U.S. an annualized ratio of 1.88 
corresponds to a monthly ratio of 0.54. The optimally hedged portfolio tends to have the 
lowest volatility as expected, the highest return, and therefore the highest Sharpe ratio. The 
unhedged portfolio has the highest volatility among the international portfolios due to added 
volatility from exchange rates, but, interestingly, even the unhedged benchmark has lower 
volatility than the domestic portfolio suggesting diversification of currency returns.
4.3 Optimal Geographical Allocation and Deviation from Benchmark
In Table 2, we show the estimated average return on foreign assets for the three methods of 
hedging and for each reporting country.
20 In general, the estimated returns of the OECD-
countries have lower means and smaller standard deviation than those for the emerging
markets. The emerging markets with the highest volatilities are Russia, Panama, Peru and 
Venezuela.
Considering the unit-hedged returns, there is a clear tendency for the core-countries in the 
European Monetary System (EMS), France, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands, to have 
_______________
19  The excess return of the risky domestic portfolio is not zero in our calculations as the risky 
domestic asset is proxied by the total return on the MSCI sovereign debt index and the 
risk-free return by the domestic 3-month t-bill rate. The return of the former is necessarily 
higher and differs by index composition, gains from diversification and reinvestment.
20 We report nominal returns. Converting to real returns affects the benchmark weights only 
to the extent that the inflation rate of the reporting country is correlated with changes in the 
exchange rate.
13rather similar means and standard deviations vis-à-vis the reporting countries France and 
Germany. This clearly reflects the convergence of interest rates experienced up to the 
introduction of the EMU. Domestic returns generally tend to have the lowest standard 
deviation, suggesting that exchange rate fluctuations matter even when hedged (the exception 
is the U.K for which the volatilities of the assets of the core-EU countries are even lower). 
The volatility of unhedged returns is always lowest for the domestic asset, obviously 
reflecting the added currency risk.
In Table 3, we compare the actual and benchmark portfolio shares derived under the three 
different hedging assumptions. Generally, the reporting countries are considerably 
overweighted domestically. This tendency is less marked for the unhedged benchmark, where 
the added volatility from exchange rates makes the domestic asset more attractive (in fact, in 
the unhedged case, the U.K. is underweighted domestically). The European reporting banks 
also overweight North America but underweight Japan. Indeed, the pattern of benchmark
weights appear to be determined by relatively volatilities, rather than expected returns. 
Therefore, the weight on European countries is high which is much in line with actual 
weights.
Note that the emerging markets generally is assigned zero weights in the benchmarks,
except Poland and Russia (and occasionally Peru and Morocco). From a mean-variance point 
of view, the higher expected returns are outweighed by the cost of added volatility. In the case 
of Poland, which is the country with the most persistent pattern of non-zero weights, the 
reporting countries are all underweighted. The same holds, albeit less systematically, for 
Russia. Also notice that reporting country banks’ overweight Latin America relative to the 
benchmarks.
The variation in actual and benchmark portfolio composition over the sample period is 
depicted in Figures 2-5 which plot the difference between actual and benchmark portfolio 
weights for the four reporting countries and for five regions (domestic, Asia (including 
Australia), E.U., North America, Latin America and East Europe (incl. Russia). Africa, 
represented by Morocco only, is left out). Generally, the domestic asset is overweighted and 
the assets of European countries are underweighted. This pattern is consistent across all 
reporting countries, although it appears that domestic overweighting is less in the U.K. 
Recalling the discussion from section 3.1 however, we know that the unconsolidated 
locational data in fact overestimates the domestic portfolio share by about 30 percentage 
points and overestimates the weight on the U.S. by 6 percent. Taking that into account we see 
that the U.K. is in fact overweighted domestically to an equal extent as the three other 
reporting countries. Finally, its worth noticing that visually one can make out a small
tendency towards the benchmarks, that is, larger internationalization, over time.
The variation in the difference between actual and benchmark weights over time tend to 
stay within the order of five percent, reflecting changes in the actual portfolio share (the 
14benchmark shares are constant over time). Considering that the actual domestic portfolio 
weights are between 70-90 percent, this variation is far from negligible. We address the 
determinants of this variation in the next section. 
5 Explaining Deviations from the Benchmark 
How should we interpret the observed differences between the benchmark and actual 
portfolio compositions? We look for explanations by regressing the differences between the 
benchmark and actual portfolios weights on variables that proxy for regulations, information
costs, and risks. Our motivation for this choice of regressors is discussed below.
5.1 Explanatory  Variables
One explanation for the observed differences in actual and benchmark portfolios is that these 
simply result from estimation or measurement error. Using ex post data, it is unlikely that the 
benchmark and actual portfolios will turn out to be identical and the variance-covariance 
matrix of returns may be estimated with error. However, the over-investment in the domestic
economy relative to the investment implied by the optimal risk-return tradeoff appears to be 
too large to be the result of measurement error, even if we take into account that the domestic
data are taken from a different source. Furthermore, if the observed deviation in weights is 
caused by such errors alone, we should not observe a systematic relationship between the 
deviation and the regressors. Yet the results in Table 5 and 6, discussed below, indicate the 
presence of systematic covariations.
The alternative explanation is that our benchmark portfolios neglect elements that are 
important to international banking. In particular, the mean-variance benchmark ignores the 
potential importance of asymmetric information or barriers resulting from regulations, as 
discussed in Section 2. We investigate this possibility by choosing regressors that are likely to
capture such factors. In particular, for each of the three hedging scenarios we first run probit 
regressions to establish the characteristics of recipient countries that are overweighted. We
then run panel regressions of the difference between the benchmark and actual weights 
(benchmark minus actual) for country i and the actual weight on country i on proxies for 
regulations, information costs, and risk. That is, we look to determine explanation for the 
deviation from benchmark, conditional on a recipient country being overweighted 
(underweighting respectively). We denote these regressions the conditional panel regressions. 
For the regressions presented below we ran with both a pooled sample and for each of the 
reporting countries separately, both of which yielded similar results. For space considerations, 
we report the pooled regressions only. 
To capture barriers to foreign investment that are related to culture and asymmetry of 
information, we use a similarity measure which is an index that equals one if a recipient 
15country either shares the language or legal system with the reporting country (the latter may
also proxy for legal risk). The index takes a value of two if both are shared. In addition, we 
include a variable measuring the distance between the partner countries. Distance measures
the shortest line between two countries’ commercial centers according to the degrees of 
latitude and longitude (in thousands of kilometers).
21 In addition, we include two variables 
which are intended to capture regulatory restrictions to foreign lending. The first is a dummy
variable which equals one when the recipient country is an EU-member taking into account 
the impact of the EU’s Single Market program. Second, we include a dummy for the presence 
of capital controls on cross-border financial credits. This variable equals one if countries 
impose controls and zero otherwise.
22
Because costs of financial distress in the business of banking may be extreme, and because 
bankruptcy therefore is associated with large deadweight costs, we also include as regressors 
variables that proxies for credit risk at the country level. We use the Euromoney score for 
political risk of nonpayment of government debt and the Euromoney score for forfaiting
premium and tenure available.
23 While the first measure likely captures the strength of
government finances, the second measure captures credit and legal risks for claims on other 
banks and non-bank firms in connection with trade finance, we think of this index as proxying 
for private sector credit risk.
5.2 Summary Statistics and Probit Regressions 
Table 4 presents summary statistics of the variables in the over- and underweighted group 
(values are averages across hedging subcases) for each of the four reporting countries. 
Recipient countries in the underweighted groups tend to be less similar to the reporting 
country, and more have capital controls imposed. Hence, the division into over- versus 
underweighted groups is correlated with the existence of two types of barriers: cultural and 
legal similarity, and capital controls.
_______________
21 Kindly provided by Dieter Schumacher from the German Institute for Economic Research 
(DIW).
22 Source: IMF Annual Reports on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. 
23 The Euromoney political risk index is constructed from a poll of risk analysts, risk 
insurance brokers, and bank credit officers. They were asked to give each country a score 
between zero and 25 (25 indicated no risk of nonpayment, zero indicates that there is no 
change of payments being made). The index of “access to and discount on forfeiting” 
reflects the average maximum maturity (tenor) available and the forfaiting spread over 
riskless countries, such as the United States. The maximum (best) score is 10. Countries 
for which forfaiting is not available score zero. Both variables vary over both the time and 
cross-sectional dimension. Data are supplied by Morgan Grenfell Trade Finance, West
Merchant Bank, the London Forfaiting Company, Standard Bank, and ING Capital.
16These statistics are confirmed by the probit regressions reported in Table 5. Countries have 
a significantly higher probability of being underweighted when they impose capital controls 
and when they are more similar to the reporting country. In contrast to the gravity literature, 
we find that geographical distance does not appear to impact the probability of a recipient 
country being underweighted and hence does not appear to be proxying for information or 
transaction costs in our context. Indeed, the impact of distance is insignificant for both the 
optimal and unit hedge cases and has a counterintuitive sign in the unhedged case.
A higher index-value of the forfaiting premium also increases the probability of being 
overweighted, suggesting that countries with a premium for credit risk are less likely to attract 
direct cross-border bank finance in line with our discussions above. Surprisingly, the political 
risk index enters significantly with a negative sign, which is contrary to economic intuition.
24
In sum, we find that barriers in the form of cultural and legal similarity and capital controls 
increase the probability of being underweighted. We also find strong evidence that banks’ 
overweight countries when the forfeiting premium, which likely proxies for private sector 
credit risk, is low.
5.3 Conditional panel regressions of deviation from benchmark 
In a second set of regressions, we attempt to explain the magnitude of the ‘bias’, i.e. of the 
difference between benchmark and actual portfolio weights. Results are reported in Table 6. 
Because we use the nominal deviation from benchmark weights as the dependent variable, we 
need to distinguish between two cases when interpreting the coefficient signs: the case where 
the benchmark weight exceeds the actual weight for country i and the deviation is positive 
(under-investment relative to benchmark) and the opposite case where the deviation is 
negative (over-investment). For the under-investment case, a negative coefficient is 
interpreted as a movement towards the benchmark (less under-investment), while a positive 
sign indicates a movement away from the benchmark (more under-investment). For the over-
investment case, the coefficient signs have the opposite interpretation. The following Table 
summarizes these effects (where   ( ) = optimal (actual) portfolio shares): opt w act w
_______________
24 We experimented by leaving out the forfeiting premium index from the regressions, but this 
did not affect the sign on the political risk (or other) variable(s) as the two indices are not 
highly correlated.
17Over-investment
0   act opt w w
Under-investment
0 !  act opt w w








In the regressions presented in Table 6, each of the explanatory variables is interacted with 
a dummy variable that equals zero if the benchmark portfolio weight exceeds the actual 
weight for a recipient country (the underweighted group) and one otherwise (the 
overweighted group), allowing for the coefficients to differ between the two groups. We use 
the FGLS estimator allowing the error terms to differ in variance across countries, correcting 
both for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the data. Time fixed effects and fixed 
effects for the reporting countries are included in all regressions but are not reported. 
In Table 6, the first thing to note is that the sign patterns do not differ markedly across 
assumptions about currency hedging (i.e. benchmarks). We run the regressions with and 
without a dummy for EU-membership because we hypothesize that the Single European 
Market may encourage cross-border lending, at least between the EU-member countries. This 
is certainly consistent with the observation discussed above that the bulk of cross-border 
lending is among EU-countries (with the exception of the U.S.). However, this fact may also 
be caused by other characteristics of the EU countries. In the regressions first notice that the 
sign of the other coefficients are generally unaffected by whether we control for this Single 
Market-effect or not. The sign on the EU coefficient is generally positive. Hence if, say, 
Germany is over-invested in certain countries, it over-invests less if that country is an EU 
member. Given its under-investing in certain countries, it under-invests even further if that 
country is an EU member.
Considering the dummy for capital controls, the results are very strong. The dummy attains 
the value of one when controls are in place, and we observe that the sign of the 
underweighted coefficient is positive, implying that underinvestment is larger in magnitude
for countries in this group when controls are imposed. Notably, the overweighted coefficient 
is insignificant as it should be ; overinvestment in itself implies that barriers are non-binding. 
The size of the coefficient is large, ranging from 2-11%, that is, the difference between the 
benchmark and actual weights is up to 11% larger for the countries in the underweighted 
group that imposes capital controls. As the average ‘value’ of capital controls for the 
underweighted group is 12.79% (Table 4), this coefficient is economically extremely
significant.
18Consider next the cultural and informational proxy-variables. If informational barriers are 
mitigating gains to international diversification and such barriers are captured by the 
similarity and distance variables, we would expect for the underweighted group a negative 
sign on similarity (higher score associated with less under-investment) and a positive sign on 
distance (further apart, more under-investment).
For distance, we tend to find a positive sign for the underweighted group, and a positive 
sign for the overweighted group. That is, the more geographically remote is the recipient 
country the more one would under-invest. This sign would correspond to an interpretation of 
distance as a proxy for information costs. The positive sign on the overweighted group 
implies a movement toward the benchmark when recipient countries are further away, which 
cannot be interpreted as a result of barriers but may be influenced by the fact that the weights 
on the over and underweighted countries must sum to one.
For the similarity dummy, we get somewhat mixed results. For the overweighted group, the 
coefficients tend to be small and are sometimes negative. For the underweighted group, they 
are large and negative assuming optimal hedging, but small and positive assuming no hedging 
is done, hence again, the unhedged subcase is not quite consistent with our ex ante 
expections. The negative coefficients are consistent with an informational barriers story 
whereas the positive signs are inconsistent with this story. Therefore, the degree of 
overinvestment is not substantially explained by similarity: it is not the case that recipient 
countries more similar to the reporting country are weighted relative more within the group of 
overweighted countries. In sum, we do not find strong evidence that neither of our proxies for 
information and cultural costs are a barrier to cross-border banking relative to the mean-
variance benchmark.
In addition to proxies for information costs and regulations, we include measures of 
political and credit risk.  Consider first the political risk index. We find a negative sign for the 
overweighted group and a positive for the underweighted group. If banks overweight, they do 
so more when political risk decreases (higher index value). Given that over-investment cannot 
be a result of barriers and that the weights for the over- and under-investment groups must
sum to one, this pattern is consistent with banks having preferences for certain countries for 
reasons unrelated to the optimal risk-return tradeoff; when political risk lessens, further
resources move to those locations. Since the domestic market is always part of the over-
investment group, this would also be consistent with banks focusing on conditions in the 
domestic market, leaving foreign investment to non-preferred countries is a residual (cf. 
Goldberg 2001). The coefficients are uniformly below one percent (.94 at the highest) While
this effect is statistically significant, it is economically much less important than the effect of 
capital controls – though a reallocation of a few percent of banks’ portfolio is by no means
negligible.
19The systematic co-variation of the deviations from the benchmark portfolio with the 
political risk variable has an interesting implication in the mean-variance framework, as 
political risk is likely priced into sovereign debt returns. The political index has a component
that is idiosyncratic relative to the benchmark portfolio which nevertheless affect banks’ 
actual portfolio shares. That is, under the benchmark model of bank behavior, idiosyncratic 
political risk appears to matter for foreign investments over and above the risk premia
incorporated into total returns on the indices.
The forfaiting index is included in the regressions to proxy for private sector credit risk, a 
risk-factor which we suspect a priori may not be well-captured by our benchmark returns. The 
sign pattern is rather less systematic than for the political index but, where significant, the 
interpretation is the same as for political risk.
6 Conclusion 
In this paper, we study the cross-border asset positions of banks located in four major
economies (reporting countries): France, Germany, the U.K., and the U.S. We argue that 
banks are likely to benefit from diversifying risks on their balance sheet by lending 
internationally through an improvement in the risk-return tradeoff due to the diversification of 
location (country)-specific risks. We use the portfolio with the highest estimated Sharpe ratio 
(optimal risk-return trade-off) in the mean-variance portfolio model as the benchmark
international portfolio allocation, and we compare this benchmark to the composition of 
banks’ actual international portfolios. We also compute this benchmark under different 
assumptions about the hedging of foreign currency risks 
The estimated gains from cross-border diversification appear considerable, increasing the 
domestic Sharpe ratio by a factor of 1.5 or more. We find that, from a mean-variance point of 
view, the effect of exchange rate risk involved in cross-border lending affects the composition
of the benchmark portfolio considerably. Hence, our estimated benchmark portfolios all 
attach a high weight to European recipient countries. Our findings may be interpreted as 
suggesting that exchange rate risk may be an important consideration when assessing the 
return from international lending.
Considering banks’ actual portfolios, we find a pattern of over-investment in the domestic
economy of the reporting country relative to the mean-variance benchmark. This pattern is 
persistent over the sample period considered.  Banks’ international assets, hence, do not 
appear to be consistent with the optimal risk-return tradeoff. This may suggest that there are 
barriers to international diversification.
Our regression analysis has proceeded in two steps. In a first step, we have explained which 
countries are over-and underweighted. Bank in the reporting countries of our sample tend to 
underweight countries with which they are less similar or which have capital controls in 
20place. High credit risk likewise lowers international bank lending, while we, surprisingly, find 
a preference for countries with high political risk. Using alternative proxies for political risk 
would be an interesting extension of this research. 
In a second step, we have explained the degree of over- and underweighting. Regressing 
the deviation between our benchmark and actual portfolio weight on variables proxying for 
country-level political, credit risk, information costs (cultural and geographical distance), we 
find strong evidence that the degree of underweighting is larger when capital controls are in 
place, whereas similarity and geography cannot explain the degree of over- or underweighting 
within the groups respectively. Also, the degree of under-investment increase in the distance 
between the reporting and the recipient country, this effect being due only to the over-
investment in the domestic economy.
Interestingly, while the degree of political risk does not appear associated with the split into 
over- and underweighted groups, our results suggest that the degree of over(under)- 
investment varies with the degree of political risk; namely, given banks’ preferences for 
certain countries, lending increases even further when risk-conditions improve, apparently 
pulling away funds from underweighted countries. This implies that idiosyncratic political 
risk affects banks’ portfolio composition. Our findings are consistent with an interpretation 
where banks have preferences for domestic lending and increased domestic lending takes 
place at the expense of lending to overseas markets.
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Average Annual Excess Return (%) 
France 3.56 4.68 3.36 2.98
Germany 3.68 4.32 4.04 3.74
UK 5.12 5.92 4.40 4.43
US 4.76 5.60 4.28 3.55
Average Annual Standard Deviation (%) 
France 1.49 1.63 1.51 1.61
Germany 1.21 1.21 1.44 1.62
UK 1.31 1.24 2.04 2.05
US 1.38 1.36 2.13 2.04
Sharpe Ratios
France 2.40 2.88 2.26 2.02
Germany 3.04 3.58 2.78 2.53
UK 3.90 4.78 2.16 2.20



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5 — Probit Regression Results
This table reports the results from a probit regression explaining which countries are overweighted and using
three alternatives for hedging exchange rate risk: optimal hedging, a unit hedges and no hedging. The dependent
variable is a dummy variable which equals one if a given recipient country is overweighted and zero otherwise.
Distance is the geographical distance between reporting and recipient country. Similarity is the sum of dummy
variables for common language and common legal system. Risk indicators were taken from Euromoney.
Political Risk is an index from 0 to 25 of risk on nonpayment. Forfaiting is an index of 0 to 10 reflecting the 
maximum tenure available and forfaiting spread relative to safest country.  EU is a dummy variable equal to one
when recipient country is an EU member. Capital controls is a dummy variable indicating whether countries
impose restrictions on cross-border financial credits. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation. ** (*) = significant at the 1% (5%)-level.
optimal unit hedge unhedged
 Log distance –0.03 –0.03 0.16**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
 Capital controls –0.91** –0.82** –0.49**
(0.17) (0.16) (0.16)
 Similarity 0.65** 0.66** –0.18
(0.13) (0.11) (0.12)
 Forfaiting 0.02** 0.03 0.02*
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
 Political risk  –0.05** –0.07** 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 1.71** 1.91** –0.84
(0.43) (0.44) (0.46)
Observations 420 420 420
3132
Table 6 — Regression Results: Deviation from Benchmark Portfolio Shares 
Table reports the results from a panel regression of the deviation from the benchmark portfolio share, using
three alternatives for hedging exchange rate risk: optimal hedging, a unit hedges and no hedging. The dependent
variable is multiplied by 100 for scaling of coefficients. Each regression reports separate coefficients on 
countries which are overweighted (underweighted) relative to the benchmark portfolio. Distance is the
geographical distance between reporting and recipient country. Similarity is the sum of dummy variables for 
common language and common legal system. Risk indicators were taken from Euromoney. Political Risk is an
index from 0 to 25 of risk on nonpayment. Forfaiting is an index of 0 to 10 reflecting the maximum tenure 
available and forfeiting spread relative to safest country.  EU is a dummy variable equal to one when recipient
country is an EU member. Capital controls is a dummy variable indicating whether countries impose restrictions
on cross-border financial credits. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelations. **
(*) = significant at the 1% (5%)-level. Time and reporting country fixed effects are included in all regressions
but are not reported.
Not including EU dummy Including EU dummy
Optimal unit hedge unhedged optimal unit hedge unhedged
Overweighted countries
 Log distance 4.01** 4.15** 0.38*** 4.98** 5.08** 0.58**
(0.31) (0.32) (0.06) (0.32) (0.33) (0.09)
 Capital controls 0.23 0.18 –0.07 0.00 0.07 –0.06
(0.24) (0.20) (0.08) (0.29) (0.27) (0.07)
 Similarity 0.33 –0.61** –0.08 1.25** 0.38 0.10
(0.43) (0.22) (0.08) (0.37) (0.33) (0.13)
 Forfaiting –0.00 –0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
 Political risk  0.02 0.03 –0.03** –0.17** –0.15** –0.07**
(0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.05) (0.05) (0.01)
 EU  8.08** 7.38** 1.38**
(0.89) (1.02) (0.29)
 Total N*T in group  274 280 319 274 280 319
Underweighted countries
 Log distance 2.86** 2.94** –1.32** 4.58** 4.57** –1.33**
(0.40) (0.55) (0.40) (0.42) (0.52) (0.41)
 Capital controls 1.28 6.74* 6.63** 2.24* 11.10** 7.48**
(1.08) (3.14) (2.31) (1.07) (2.48) (2.38)
Similarity –7.94** 5.16 1.89* –8.30** 3.23 1.76*
(1.10) (4.39) (0.86) (1.39) (3.57) (0.86)
Forfaiting 1.33** 2.01** 0.87 0.90** 1.34** 0.90*
(0.38) (0.55) (0.48) (0.34) (0.45) (0.51)
 Political risk  0.94** 0.73** 0.45** 0.44** 0.37** 0.49**
(0.10) (0.12) (0.12) (0.09) (0.10) (0.15)
 EU  16.22** 11.54** 1.03
(1.61) (1.47) (1.59)
Constant –34.62** –36.21** –2.61** –42.67** –43.63** –3.97**
(2.73) (2.82) (0.53) (2.97) (3.00) (0.75)
 Total N*T in group  126 120 81 126 120 81
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